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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this joint appeal, defendants Michael McKie, Guy 
Henry and Jermaine Hall challenge their convictions on 
weapons offenses. We will reverse defendants' convictions 
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for unlawful firearm possession under Virgin Islands law, 




On April 14, 1995, at 12:30 a.m. in St. Croix, defendants' 
car was stopped for a traffic violation. Four police officers 
ordered the driver, McKie, out of the car. The passengers, 
Hall, Henry and a juvenile, were also ordered to leave the 
car after an officer observed them conversing and looking 
around inside the car. At that point, an officer spotted a .38 
caliber revolver on the back seat of the car. Further 
inspection revealed two more firearms -- a Tec-9 machine 
gun1 on the front passenger sidefloorboard, and a .45 
caliber pistol on the rear driver's side floorboard.2 
 
At trial, Hall testified that he and the other defendants 
flew to St. Croix from St. Thomas on a chartered airplane. 
They arrived at 11 a.m. to attend a reggae concert later that 
evening. Although unemployed, Hall brought with him $700 
in cash that he had accumulated by gambling and cock 
fighting. Upon arrival, they were met by a friend whose car 
they borrowed. 
 
Hall testified that after arriving in St. Croix, he received 
a death threat from someone who previously had shot him. 
He did not report this to the police but instead decided to 
obtain a firearm. By chance, he ran into an acquaintance 
who sold him three firearms for $500. Hall testified he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Tec-9 pistol is considered a machine gun under Virgin Islands law 
because, even though it cannot fire in fully automatic mode, it has the 
capacity to fire more than 12 shots without reloading. See V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 14, § 2253(d)(2). Under federal law, this weapon is not classified as 
a machine gun but as a semiautomatic assault weapon. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(30)(a)(viii). 
 
2. The .38 caliber revolver was positioned between Hall and the juvenile, 
"on top of the back seat . . . a long bench seat . . . right in the middle 
of the seat, just sitting there." The Tec-9 machine gun was located on 
the front passenger side floorboard, "right on the floor, right where your 
feet would be." The .45 caliber pistol was located on the rear driver's side 
floorboard where the juvenile had been sitting. At trial, a firearms expert 
testified that each of the three firearms was loaded with ammunition and 
ready to fire. 
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concealed the three weapons in the car without telling 
McKie and Henry about his purchase. 
 
According to Hall, defendants left in the car to attend the 
concert around 10:30 p.m. McKie was driving. Hall initially 
sat in the front passenger seat and Henry in the back, but 
they switched positions when Henry complained about 
being cramped in the back of the subcompact car (an Isuzu 
I-Mark). As noted, defendants were stopped by the police 
around 12:30 a.m. 
 
All three defendants were convicted under Count I of the 
indictment for possession of a firearm with an obliterated 
serial number in violation of federal law (18 U.S.C. 
§§ 922(k) and 2) and under Counts II and III for possession 
of firearms in violation of Virgin Islands law (V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 14, §§ 2253(a), (b) and 11). McKie was also convicted 
under Count IV for possession of a firearm by a felon in 
violation of federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). McKie was 
sentenced to 60 months imprisonment on Count I, 5 years 
each on Counts II and III, and 72 months on Count IV, all 
to run concurrently. Hall was sentenced to 36 months on 
Count I and 30 months each for Counts II and III, with the 
territorial sentences to run concurrently but consecutive to 
the federal sentence. Henry was sentenced to 37 months on 
Count I and 3 years each on Counts II and III, all to run 
concurrently. 
 
As we have noted, all defendants appeal their firearm 
convictions under Virgin Islands law. Hall also appeals the 
district court's denial of his motion to compel performance 





Before trial, the government offered a plea agreement to 
Hall. In exchange for his guilty plea, truthful testimony at 
trial and "complete debriefing" regarding the guns, the 
government would recommend a reduction in his offense 
level. But during debriefing, the government questioned 
Hall's credibility and withdrew the plea offer. Hall now 
claims the district court erred in denying his motion to 
compel performance of the plea agreement. We review for 
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abuse of discretion. See United States v. Trott, 779 F.2d 
912, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1985); Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 219-20 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
Hall contends the government breached the plea 
agreement by withdrawing the plea offer. But the plea 
agreement recites, "The defendant [Hall] recognizes that, in 
the event it is determined he has made any materially false 
statements pursuant to this agreement, the agreement will 
be voided." Hall also argues he did not get the benefit of his 
bargain with the government. But neither did the 
government. Hall neither pled guilty nor testified for the 
government at trial. In the plea agreement, the government 
retained discretion to withdraw its offer. The district court 




Defendants challenge their convictions for possession of 
firearms in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14,§§ 2253(a) 
and (b).4 The statute provides in part: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Although Hall was invited by the court to move for an evidentiary 
hearing on this matter at the end of trial, he failed to do so. Whether or 
not this constitutes waiver, see Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986), the district court properly 
denied his motion. 
 
4. As noted, defendants do not appeal their federal firearm convictions 
for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 2. Because McKie and Henry are 
serving their unchallenged federal sentences concurrently with their 
territorial sentences, the concurrent sentence doctrine may apply. Under 
the concurrent sentence doctrine, we have discretion to avoid resolution 
of legal issues affecting less than all of the counts in an indictment 
where at least one count will survive and the sentences on all counts are 
concurrent. See United States v. American Investors of Pittsburgh, Inc., 
879 F.2d 1087, 1100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989). The 
concurrent sentence doctrine may not be invoked where a defendant 
may suffer collateral consequences from the multiple convictions. It is 
rarely invoked in federal court now because of the mandatory $50.00 
assessment imposed on each federal count resulting in conviction. See 
Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 737 (1987) (holding concurrent 
sentence doctrine does not apply where a monetary assessment is 
imposed on each count because of the collateral consequences of the 
multiple convictions, i.e. a defendant's "liability to pay th[e] total depends 
on the validity of each of his . . . convictions."). 
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(a) Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, 
has, possesses, bears, transports or carries either 
openly or concealed on or about his person, or under 
his control in any vehicle of any description any 
firearm . . . may be arrested without a warrant, and 
shall be sentenced to imprisonment . . . . 
 
(b) Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, 
has, possesses, bears, transports or carries either 
openly or concealed on or about his person, or under 
his control in any vehicle of any description any 
machine gun . . . may be arrested without a warrant, 
and shall be sentenced to imprisonment . . . . 
 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253 (emphasis added). McKie 
contends the weapons were not under his control. In 
addition, all three defendants contend the government 
failed to meet its burden to prove their possession was not 




"A weapon is under one's control, within the meaning of 
§ 2253, if it is in an area from which [one] might gain 
immediate possession." United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 
1281, 1289 (3d Cir. 1993). We believe there was sufficient 
evidence to sustain a verdict that the weapons in the 
vehicle were under McKie's control. Each of the three 
firearms was in plain view inside the car. The car was 
described as a subcompact, and Hall testified that two of 
the occupants changed places because of cramped seating. 
At trial, one of the officers testified that all the weapons 
were "in the open." Photographs of the guns' locations were 
displayed to the jury. Based on this evidence we believe the 
jury could have reasonably inferred that McKie knew of and 
had immediate access to the guns. See New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) ("[A]rticles inside the relatively 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
But Hall's sentences on his territorial and federal convictions are not 
concurrent. Because it will be necessary to decide the validity of Hall's 
Virgin Islands conviction, we will not address whether the concurrent 
sentence doctrine applies to the other defendants. 
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narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, 
within `the area into which an arrestee might reach in order 
to grab a weapon . . . .' ") (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). The weapons were therefore under 




It is the government's burden under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 
14, § 2253 to prove defendants were unauthorized to carry 
or possess the guns. See Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1289. The 
district court held the government would satisfy this 
burden by proving, among other things, that defendants did 
not have a firearms license. But defendants contend that, 
under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 470 (1968) (amended Sept. 
1996), unlicensed firearm possession is not unauthorized 
by law until it lasts beyond a twenty-four hour period. 
Defendants maintain the government bears the burden to 
prove possession beyond twenty-four hours. The 
government disagrees, contending § 470 provides 
defendants an affirmative defense to a charged violation of 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253, and falls within defendants' 
burden of production. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197, 210 (1977) (holding the government need not prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of all 
affirmative defenses); Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 
949 F.2d 677, 686 (3d Cir. 1991) (defendant bears burden 




At the time of the arrest, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23,§ 470 
(1968), allowed gun owners twenty-four hours to register 
their firearms: 
 
(a) Any person . . . who purchases or otherwise 
obtains any firearms or ammunition from any source 
within or outside of the Virgin Islands shall report such 
fact in writing or in person to the Commissioner within 
24 hours after receipt of the firearm or ammunition 
. . . . 
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(c) . . . If the person is not qualified for a license then 
the Commissioner shall retain the firearms or 
ammunition . . . , but no prosecution shall lie against 
the person for unlawful possession of the firearm or 
ammunition.5 
 
The twenty-four hour grace period was removed from§ 470 
in September 1996. Under the current statute, a person 
must obtain a license "immediately" upon possession of a 
firearm. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 470 (Sept. 1996). 
 
Defendants argue it was the government's burden to 
prove their firearm possession lasted beyond twenty-four 
hours. It is always the government's burden to prove 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The complete text of § 470 (1968) provided: 
 
(a) Any person other than a licensed dealer, who purchases or 
otherwise obtains any firearms or ammunition from any source 
within or outside of the Virgin Islands shall report such fact in 
writing or in person to the Commissioner within 24 hours after 
receipt of the firearm or ammunition, furnishing a complete 
description of the firearm or ammunition purchased or otherwise 
obtained. He shall also furnish his own name, address, date of birth 
and occupation. 
 
(b) Any person upon entering the Virgin Islands bringing with him 
any firearm or ammunition shall report in writing or in person to 
the Commissioner within 24 hours of his arrival, furnishing a 
complete description of the firearm or ammunition brought into the 
Virgin Islands. He shall also furnish his own name, address, date of 
birth and occupation. 
 
(c) In the event the person reporting under subsections (a) or (b), 
above, is qualified for a license to carry firearms in the Virgin 
Islands, the Commissioner shall issue the same, upon payment of 
the proper fee, and the firearm shall be registered in the Weapons 
Register provided for in section 469 of this chapter. If the person is 
not qualified for a license then the Commissioner shall retain the 
firearms or ammunition for disposition in accordance with the 
provisions of section 475 of this chapter, but no prosecution shall 
lie against the person for unlawful possession of the firearm or 
ammunition. 
 
(d) Any person who fails to comply with this section shall be 
punished as provided in section 484 of this chapter [the General 
Penalty section]. 
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"beyond a reasonable doubt . . . every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which [a defendant] is charged." 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The issue, then, is 
whether possession for more than twenty-four hours is a 
fact necessary to constitute the crime of unlawful 
possession in violation of § 2253. Our review of statutory 
construction is plenary. See Christopher v. Davis Beach Co., 
15 F.3d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
We must first look to the language of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 
14, § 2253. See United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 
879 (3d Cir. 1994). The statute punishes anyone who, 
"unless otherwise authorized by law, has, possesses, bears, 
transports or carries either openly or concealed on or about 
his person, or under his control in any vehicle of any 
description any firearm." Section 2253 does not mention 
duration of possession nor does it reference the twenty-four 
hour grace period in § 470. In the past we have interpreted 
the clause "unless otherwise authorized by law" to mean 
possession without a license. See Government of Virgin 
Islands v. Soto, 718 F.2d 72, 80 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he 
gravamen of [§ 2253] appears to have been the possession 
of unlicensed firearms . . . ."); Government of Virgin Islands 
v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 763 n.7 (3d Cir. 1982) (approving 
a jury instruction that § 2253(a) is violated if, "the 
defendant possessed the firearm; . . . he was not licensed 
to possess it; and . . . it meets the definition .. . of a 
firearm."). The government must prove the absence of a 
firearms license. But we have never designated proof of 
possession for more than twenty-four hours as an element 
of the crime. 
 
Nonetheless, we will examine whether possession for less 
than twenty-four hours is a proper affirmative defense 
under the Supreme Court standard. At issue is whether the 
government is required to prove enough under § 2253, 
without proof of duration, "to make it just for the defendant 
to be required to repel" the charges with an affirmative 
defense. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 203 n.9 (quoting Morrison v. 
California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934)). We must balance the 
parties' "opportunities for knowledge" and determine 
whether "the shifting of the burden will be found to be an 
aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to 
hardship or oppression." Id. 
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A balancing of the "opportunities for knowledge" reveals 
it is far easier for the defendant to know of, and assert, 
firearm possession under twenty-four hours than it is for 
the government to establish possession for more than 
twenty-four hours. Except when a firearm is purchased 
lawfully from a vendor who keeps records and the purchase 
and buyer are capable of being traced, we believe that when 
a firearm was obtained is almost always exclusively within 
the knowledge of the defendant. See United States v. 
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 63 (1965) (The "practical 
impossibility" of proving a statutory violation resulted in 
presumption against defendants charged with violating the 
statute.) 
 
In addition, the defendants' argument would require the 
government to prove in each prosecution that none of the 
statutory exceptions to the firearm license requirement are 
satisfied.6 Such an interpretation would conflict with our 
obligation to construe statutes sensibly and avoid 
constructions which yield absurd or unjust results. See 
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 225 
(3d Cir. 1979). 
 
After the government proves unlicensed firearm 
possession, we do not find it a hardship for the defendant 
to come forward with evidence of the duration of possession.7 
Therefore, we hold § 470 is not an element of the offense of 
unlawful firearm possession under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 2253, but rather is an affirmative defense. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For example, the government would have to prove the defendants are 
not members of any of the armed forces of the United States, see V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 23, § 453(a)(1), that defendants are not officers or 
employees of a federal agency authorized by law to carry firearms, see 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 453(a)(2), that defendants are not jail wardens, 
see V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 453(a)(5), and that defendants do not have 
licenses to carry firearms in any of the United States, see V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 23, § 460. 
 
7. It is consistent with Virgin Islands statutory law to draw an inference 
against a defendant from his unlicensed firearm possession. See, e.g., 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(c) (Defendant's unlicensed firearm 
possession "shall be evidence of his intention to commit [a] crime of 
violence."). 
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2. 
 
But this is not the end of the inquiry. Defendants also 
contend they are entitled to acquittal because they 
presented uncontradicted evidence they purchased the 
guns less than twenty-four hours before their arrest. The 
district court instructed the jury that it may nonetheless 
convict defendants unless they intended to obtain afirearm 
license within twenty-four hours and were prevented from 
doing so by their arrests. Defendants challenge the court's 
instruction on intent, contending they may not be convicted 
as a matter of law if their possession did not extend beyond 
twenty-four hours. 
 
The district court relied on Government of Virgin Islands 
v. King, No. CRIM. 529/1994, 1995 WL 217613 (Terr. Ct. 
V.I. March 3, 1995), which held the twenty-four hour grace 
period protects only those persons who intend to register 
and lawfully own their firearms, stating "[s]ection 470 is not 
a refuge for all who desire to possess a gun for less than a 
day." Id., 1995 WL 217613, at *5. The government urges us 
to follow King, arguing the stated purpose of § 470 is to 
proscribe possession of unlicensed firearms. See V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 23, ch. 5 (1968) (Annotations) ("This chapter 
[including § 470] provides for penalizing constructive 
possession of an unlicensed firearm . . . .") The history of 
Virgin Islands statutory law reveals a consistent increase in 
the penalty for unlawful gun possession,8  and a consistent 
decrease in the time allowed for firearm registration.9 The 
government argues that interpreting § 470 to immunize 
anyone arrested within twenty-four hours of a purchase is 
directly contrary to § 470's legislative intent. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In 1957, carrying a concealed firearm without a license resulted in 
imprisonment for up to one year. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2252 (1957). 
The current penalty for simple firearm possession is a maximum of three 
years and a minimum of six months incarceration. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 2253(a). 
 
9. In 1953, firearm owners were required to register their firearms within 
forty-eight hours. Ord. Mun. C. St. T. and St. J. app. Dec. 18, 1953, Bill 
no. 291. In 1968, the period was decreased to twenty-four hours. V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 23, § 470 (1968). In September 1996, the statute was 
amended again, requiring "immediate" registration. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 
23, § 470 (Sept. 1996). 
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The government maintains the Virgin Islands legislature 
did not intend § 470 to provide a refuge for gun owners who 
never intended to register their firearms. But the language 
of § 470 does not include a requirement of "intent to 
register" for a firearm license. It simply requires registration 
"within 24 hours." Other than King, the government cites 
no authority for its interpretation. We have examined 
similar statutes from other states, but we have been unable 
to find any court which creates an intent requirement 
under similar circumstances. We must interpret criminal 
statutes strictly, "and any ambiguity must be resolved in 
favor of lenity" towards the defendants. United States v. 
Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); United States v. Long, 
654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
The language of the statute (now repealed) was clear and 
unambiguous. It required only that "[a]ny person . . . who 
purchases or otherwise obtains any firearm . . .[to] report 
such fact . . . within 24 hours after receipt of thefirearm 
. . . ." V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 470 (1968). If the legislature 
meant to include "intent to report" as part of the defense, 
it did not say so. See Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Smalls, No. CRIM. F12/1994, 1995 WL 457975 (Terr. Ct. 
V.I. July 27, 1995) ("[W]hether a defendant intended to 
report the firearm or not does not vitiate the legal authority 
to possess the firearm for twenty four hours before 
reporting it. There is no element of `intent to report' under 
the statute."). For this reason, we believe, the Virgin Islands 
legislature eliminated the twenty-four hour grace period in 
September 1996. Section 470 now requires registration 
"immediately" upon possession of a firearm. 
 
The extensive legislative history reveals the reasons for 
the amendment. Concerned with the conflict between the 
territorial court decisions in King and Smalls, the 
legislature wanted to close the loophole created by the 
twenty-four hour grace period. As stated by one Virgin 
Islands senator, "[W]ith a loophole as big as the one that is 
currently on the books that allow[s] for a 24 hour reporting 
period you can clearly see that anyone at any time can 
easily utilize that loophole as a means of getting out of their 
basic responsibility and their whole possession of afirearm 
whether acquired legally or illegally." Hearing on Bill No. 21- 
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0219, to amend Title 23, Section 470 of the Virgin Islands 
Code, Reg. Sess. (V.I. Aug. 29, 1996) (statement of Senator 
Osbert Potter). Another senator stated, "This bill involves 
closing some loopholes that essentially provide for a field 
day for a criminal element in the area of firearm 
possession." Id. (statement of Senator Almando Liburd). 
And yet another said, "There are too many guns in this 
community. And if we don't start by closing these loopholes 
we never will." Id. (statement of Senator Lorraine L. Berry). 
"We believe "intent to report" was not an element of the 
affirmative defense of firearm possession for less than 
twenty-four hours, as it existed under § 470 before its 
recent amendment. Because the defendants presented 
uncontradicted evidence of possession for less than twenty- 
four hours,10 we find theirfirearm possession was not 
unauthorized by Virgin Islands law. Therefore we must 
reverse defendants' convictions under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 




We will reverse the convictions of all defendants under 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 2253(a), (b) and 11 (Counts II and 
III of the indictment). We will remand for resentencing on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The district court implied in its jury instructions that the duration of 
firearm possession was under twenty-four hours: 
 
Now, Virgin Islands firearms licensing law allows someone who 
obtains a firearm in the territory a grace period of 24 hours after 
receiving the firearm to report that fact to the Commissioner of 
Police for the purpose of obtaining a license for the firearm. . . . 
 
You've heard the testimony of defendant, Jermaine Hall, that he 
bought these three firearms . . . in the early evening of the night the 
car was stopped and he was arrested for these charges. 
 
If, after you examine the evidence, you find that Mr. Hall possessed 
these firearms . . . and did not have a license to possess these 
firearms, you should then consider his testimony in determining 
whether he intended to report his purchase, and whether his arrest 
prevented him from so reporting his purchase of the guns to the 
police within 24 hours. 
 
(Appellants' Br. at 222a - 223a.) 
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the remaining convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 2.11 
See United States v. Levy, 865 F.2d 551, 559 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1989) ("[W]here the sentences imposed on two of the three 
counts are vacated and all three sentences arise from the 
same criminal transaction, it is appropriate to vacate the 
third, valid sentence in order to afford the trial judge an 
opportunity to properly exercise his sentencing discretion 
. . . .") (citations omitted). 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




11. As we have noted, all defendants were convicted of violating 18 
U.S.C. § 922(k) and 2, which prohibit possession (and aiding and 
abetting possession) of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. 
McKie was also convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1), which 
prohibits possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendants did not appeal 
their convictions for the § 922 violations.                                 
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